Tag: Social Media

Bits and pieces of issues regarding the happy sharing of your children’s lives on Facebook

It's just a picture of them playing, they don't mind. Like!

It’s just a picture of them playing, they don’t mind. Like!

Similarly to what is happening in other EU Member States’ courts, Portuguese courts have been struggling with the application of traditional legal concepts to the online context. Just recently, in a decision which I addressed here, it considered that those having in their possession of a video containing intimate images of an ex-partner are under the obligation to properly guard it and the omission to practice adequate safeguard are condemned as a relevant omission.

Thus said, there is one particular decision which was issued by a Portuguese appealing court last year that I failed to timely address and which concerns the very specific rights of image of children in the online context. Considering the amount of pictures that appear on my Facebook wall every time I log in on my account and the concerns expressed by the upcoming GDPR in regards of the collection and processing of data referring to minors of sixteen, I would like to address it today.

The court at stake confirmed the decision of the court of first instance, issued within a process of regulating the parental responsibilities of each progenitor, which forbid a separated couple to divulge on social media platforms pictures or information identifying their twelve years old daughter. It severely stated that children are not things or objects belonging to their parents.

One would expected that a court decision would not be necessary to achieve the conclusion according to which children have the right to have their privacy and image respected and safeguarded even from acts practised by their parents. In fact, one would hope that, in the online context, and considering their specific vulnerability and the particular dangers facilitated by medium of the Internet, their protection would be ensured primarily by their parents.

Ironically, the link to the news referring to this court decision was greatly shared among my Facebook friends, most of them with children of their own. The same ones who actually happily share pictures of their own kids. And who haven’t decreased the sharing of information involving their children since then.

It is funny how some people get offended or upset when someone posts online a picture in which they are not particularly favoured or of which they are embarrassed and are quick to require its removal, and do not wonder if it is ethical to publish a picture of information about someone who is not able to give his/her consent. Shouldn’t we worry what type of information would children – our own, our friend’s, our little cousin or nephew – want to see about themselves online in the future?

Every time I log in my Facebook account, there is an array of pictures of birthday parties, afternoons by the sea, first days at school, promenades in the park, playtimes in the swimming pool, displays of leisure activities, such as playing musical instruments or practising a sportive activity… In a particular case, it has been divulged that the child had a serious illness, which fortunately has been overcome ever since but which received full Facebook graphic and descriptive coverage at the time of the ongoing development.

I have seen pictures where my friends’ children appear almost naked or in unflattering poses, or where it is clearly identifiable where they go to school or spend holidays. Many identify their children by their name, age, school they attend, extracurricular activities… In any case, their parenthood is quite well established. I always think that, in the long run, it would permit the building of an extended and detailed profile for anybody which has access to such data. And, if you had read any of my other posts, you know by now that I am not exactly referring to the Facebook friends.

More worryingly, these details about the children’s lives are often displayed on the parents’ online profiles, perhaps due to simple distraction or unawareness, without any privacy settings being implemented. Consequently, anybody having a Facebook account can look for the intended person and have access to all the information contained on that profile.

I do not want to sound like a killjoy, a prude or a moralist. I get it, seriously, I do. A child is the biggest love and it is only human to want to proudly share his growth, development and achievement with relatives and friends. It has always been done and now it is almost effortless and immediate, at the distance of a click. In this regard, by forbidding the sharing of any picture or any information regarding children, the abovementioned decision seems excessive and unrealistic.

Nevertheless, one should not forget that some good sense and responsibility is particularly required in the online context, considering how easy it actually is to lose control of the purposes given to the published information besides the initial ones. As many seem to forget, once uploaded on an online platform, it is no longer within our reach, as they can be easily copied or downloaded by others.

Thus said, while it is certainly impossible to secure anonymity online, the amount of information that is published should be controlled for security, privacy and data protection purposes.

Anyway, this common practice of parents sharing online pictures and information regarding their children makes me wonder how companies such as Facebook, and other platforms focusing on user generated content, who process data at the direction of the user and, consequently, who unintentionally have to collect and process personal data regarding children below the age of sixteen, may be asked to comply with the new requirements of the GDPR in that regard.

If it is to be lawful if and to the extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility, and if, as the Portuguese court have understood it, parents are not entitled to dispose of their children’s image on social media, a funny conundrum is generated. If the parents cannot publish such information, they will not be able to authorize it either and, consequently, children/teenagers won’t be able to rely on their parents’ authorization to use social media.

The dangers of certain apps or how to put your whole life out there

Finding love, one data breach at a time.

Finding love, one data breach at a time.

One of my past flatmates was actively looking for love online. Besides having registered in several websites for that end, I remember he also had several mobile applications (apps) installed in his Smartphone. I think he actually subscribed pretty much anything that even remotely could help him find love but outlined Tinder as his main dating tool.

Another of my closest friends is a jogging addicted – shout out P. He has installed on his Smartphone various apps which enable him to know how much steps he has made in a particular day, the route undertaken, and the heart rate via external device, which enables him to monitor his progresses.

What both of my friends have in common? Well, they actually use mobile apps to cover very specific necessities. And in this regard they can rely with almost anybody else.

Indeed, it is difficult to escape apps nowadays. Now that everyone (except for my aunt) seems to have a Smartphone, apps are increasingly popular for the most diversified purposes. For my prior flatmate it was all about dating. For my friend, it is to keep track of his running progresses. But their potential does not end there. From receiving and sending messages, using maps and navigation services, receiving news updates, playing games, dating or just checking the weather… You name a necessity or convenience, and there is an app for it.

On the downside, using apps usually requires to provide more or less personal information to the specific intended effect. Something that has become so usual that most consider as a natural step, without giving it further consideration.

In fact, a detail that most seem to be unaware of, apps allow for a massive collection and processing of personal – and sometimes sensitive – data. In fact, the nature and the amount of personal data accessed and collected raises serious privacy and data protection concerns.

For instance, in the case of my abovementioned flatmate, who was registered on several similar apps, and considering that he did not create fake accounts nor provided false information, each of them collected at least his name, age, gender, profession, location (enabling to presume where he worked, lived and spend time), sexual orientation, what he looks like (if he added a picture to his profiles), the frequency of his accesses to the app, and eventually the success of his online dating life.

In fact, in Tinder’s own words:

Information we collect about you

In General. We may collect information that can identify you such as your name and email address (“personal information”) and other information that does not identify you. We may collect this information through a website or a mobile application. By using the Service, you are authorizing us to gather, parse and retain data related to the provision of the Service. When you provide personal information through our Service, the information may be sent to servers located in the United States and countries around the world.
Information you provide. In order to register as a user with Tinder, you will be asked to sign in using your Facebook login. If you do so, you authorize us to access certain Facebook account information, such as your public Facebook profile (consistent with your privacy settings in Facebook), your email address, interests, likes, gender, birthday, education history, relationship interests, current city, photos, personal description, friend list, and information about and photos of your Facebook friends who might be common Facebook friends with other Tinder users. You will also be asked to allow Tinder to collect your location information from your device when you download or use the Service. In addition, we may collect and store any personal information you provide while using our Service or in some other manner. This may include identifying information, such as your name, address, email address and telephone number, and, if you transact business with us, financial information. You may also provide us photos, a personal description and information about your gender and preferences for recommendations, such as search distance, age range and gender. If you chat with other Tinder users, you provide us the content of your chats, and if you contact us with a customer service or other inquiry, you provide us with the content of that communication.

Considering that Tinder makes available a catalogue of profiles of geographically nearby members, among which one can swipe right or left, according to each one personal preferences, with the adequate analysis, it is even possible to define what type of persons (according to age, body type, hair colour) users find most attractive.

And because Tinder actually depends on having a Facebook profile, I guess that Facebook also gets aware of the average climate of your romantic life. Mainly if you start adding and interacting with your new friends on that platform and, why not, changing your status accordingly.

In the specific case of Tinder, as it mandatorily requires to be provided with a certain amount of Facebook information in order to ensure its proper functioning, these correlations are much easier for this app.

Thus said, a sweep conducted by 26 privacy and data protection authorities from around the world on more than 1,000 diversified apps, thus including Apple and Android apps, free and paid apps, public sector and private sector apps, and ranging from games and health/fitness apps, to news and banking apps has made possible to outline the main concerns at stake.

One of the issues specifically pointed out referred to the information provided to the users/data subjects, as it was concluded that many apps did not have a privacy policy. Therefore, in those cases, users were not properly informed – and therefore aware – about the collection, use, or further disclosure of the personal information provided.

It is a fact that most of us do not read the terms and conditions made available. And most will subscribe pretty much any service he/she is willing to use, disregarding what those terms and conditions actually state.

Nevertheless, a relevant issue in this regard is the excessive amount of data collected considering the purposes for which the information is provided or how it is sneakily collected. For instance, even gambling apps, such as solitaire, which seem far more innocuous, hide unknown risks, as many contain code enabling the access to the user’s information or to his contacts’ list and even allow to track the user’s browsing activities.

This is particularly worrisome when sensitive data, such as health information is at stake. This kind of data is easily collected through fitness orientated apps, which are quite in vogue nowadays. Besides any additional personally identifiable information which you will eventually provide upon creating an account, among the elements which most certainly are collected, one can find: from the name or user name, date of birth, current weight, target weight, height, gender, workouts frequency, workout settings and duration of your workout, heart rate. Also, if you train outdoors, geo-location will most certainly enable to assess the whereabouts of your exercising, from the departure to the arrival points, which will most probably coincide with your home address or its vicinities.

And, if you are particularly proud of your running or cycling results, and are willing to show up to all your friends in what good shape you actually are, there is a chance that you can actually connect the app to your Facebook and display that information in your profile, subsequently enabling Facebook to access the same logged information.

And things actually get worse when considering that, as demonstrated by recent data breaches, it seems that the information provided by their users is not even adequately protected.

For instance, and if I remember it well, due to a security vulnerability in Tinder – that apparently has been already fixed – it seemed that there was a time where the location data, such as longitude and latitude coordinates of users were actually easily accessible. Which is actually quite creepy and dangerous, as it would facilitate stalking and harassment in real life, which is as bad as it is happening online.

Anyway, it is actually very easy to forget the amount of data we provide apps with. However, the correlations that can be made, the conclusions which can be inferred, the patterns that can be assessed amounts to share more information than what we first realise and enables a far more detailed profile of ourselves than most of us would feel comfortable with others knowing.

Practical difficulties of the GDPR – the ‘right to be forgotten’ applied to online social platforms

From all the legal challenges that the GDPR will present for businesses in general, I would like to address in this post the issues raised by its implementation in regards of social network platforms, which are quite popular nowadays.

Article 17 of the GDPR establishes the ‘right to erasure’ or the right to be forgotten, as it has come to referred to, which provides data subjects with the right to require from data controllers the erasure of their personal data held by the latter, and the consequent obligation of controller, upon that request to abide, without undue delay, when certain conditions are fulfilled.

Considering that infringing the ‘right to erasure’ may lead to the application of significant economic sanctions, there is the risk that social platforms will be tempted to adopt a preventing approach by complying to all the deletion requests, disregarding their validity, thus erasing content on unfounded grounds. This is particularly worrisome because it may directly lead to the suppression of free speech online. Consequently, online businesses are not and should not be deemed competent to make any assessment in regards of the legitimacy of such claims, a point that I have already tried to make here.

While it seems that a notice and take down mechanism is envisaged without much detail being provided in regards of its practical enforceability, a particular issue in this context is the one related to the identities upon which such obligation impends. Indeed, the obligation to implement the ‘right to be forgotten’ can only be required from those who qualify as data controllers.

As data controllers are defined as the entities who determine the purposes and means of the processing of personal data, it is not clear if online social platforms providers can be defined as such.

Considering the well-known Google Spain case, it is at least certain that search engines are deemed to be controllers in this regard. As you may certainly remember, the CJEU ruled that individuals, provided that certain prerequisites are met, have the right to require from search engines, such as Google, to remove certain results about them, subsequently presented to a search based on a person’s name

Thus said, it is questionable if hosting platforms and online social networks, focused on user generated content, as it is the case of Facebook, qualify as such, considering that the data processed depends of the actions of the users who upload the relevant information. Therefore, the users themselves qualify as controllers. The language of Recital 15 of the GDPR about social networking is inconclusive in this regard.

The abovementioned Recital provides as follows:

This Regulation should not apply to processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus without a connection with a professional or commercial activity. Personal and household activities could include
correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and on-line activity undertaken within the context of such personal and household activities. However, this Regulation should apply to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing personal data for such personal or household activities.

This is not an irrelevant issue, though. In practice, it will amount to enable someone to require and effectively compel Twitter or Facebook to delete the information about her/him despite being provided by others.

And considering that any legal instrument is proportionally as efficient in practice as it is capable of being enforced, the definition of whom is covered and ought to comply with it is unquestionably a paramount element.

As I remember to read elsewhere – I fail to remember where, unfortunately – one wondered if the intermediary liability as foreseen in the e-Commerce Directive would be an appropriate mechanism for the enforcement of the right to erasure/right to be forgotten.

Articles 12-14 of the e-Commerce Directive indeed exempt information society services from liability under specific circumstances, namely when they act as a ‘mere conduit’ of information, or engage in ‘caching’ (the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of information), or when ‘hosting’ (i.e., storing information at the request of a recipient of the service).

Article 15 establishes the inexistence of any general duty impending on online intermediaries to monitor or actively seek facts indicating illegal activity on their websites.

Having into account the general liability of online intermediaries foreseen in the E-commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market), a particular distinction will perhaps apply according to the level of ‘activity’ or ‘passivity’ of the platforms in the management of the content provided by their users.

However this liability does not fully clarify the extent of the erasure obligation. Will it be proportionate to the degree of ‘activity’ or ‘passivity’ of the service provider in regards of the content?

Moreover, it is not clear how both regimes can be applied simultaneously. While the GDPR does not refer to any notice and take down mechanism and expressly refers that its application is without prejudice of the e-Commerce Directive liability rules, the fact is that the GDPR only establishes the ‘duty of erasure’ to controllers. As the intermediary liability rules require accountability for the activities of third-parties, this is a requirement not easy to overcome.

Thus considering, the most awaited GDPR hasn’t entered into force yet but I already cannot wait for the next chapters.

Sex in the city: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy when having sex with the lights on?

When I read this post I could not help remembering the discussions within the Privacy module of the post grad learning programme I have recently enrolled in. A particular issue discussed was precisely the legitimate expectation of privacy regarding events which take place in public, such as those analysed in the Peck, Campbell or Von Hannover cases.

In the situation at stake, two office colleagues had sex in the workplace premises, with the lights on, having forgotten to pull the blinds down… and therefore in full view of transients and the customers of the pub located right across the street, who were able to observe the full scene, unnoticed from the inside.

The events were recorded by many (how useful are Smartphones in these situations!) and uploaded to the Internet. Obviously, it did not take long to spread both on social media and on the press and very quickly the couple has inadvertently become a viral sensation. Their sexual performance has been broadly gossiped, commented, assessed and rated. They have been publicly identified since then and details regarding their personal lives have been exposed.

Putting aside other pertinent considerations in regards of what internal proceedings the company should take, I would like to focus on the privacy issues at stake.

Our expectation of privacy does not forcefully depends of the place where the events take place. It is not because something happens in a public space or is visible by the public or from a public place that any reasonable expectation of privacy is automatically excluded. It suffices to think that most of our private life, such as conversations or encounters,  actually happens in public. How unfortunate would it be if that mere fact would ultimately deprive us of any expectation of living our lives discreetly. It would not be remotely reasonable to accept that people abdicate of their privacy expectations once they leave their homes. Specially when considering all the buzz surrounding smart TVs, our privacy is at risk even in our own households.

In this particular case, it was late in the evening and the couple expected to be alone in the office and away from peering eyes. It is unquestionbly a quite different situation than that of having sex in broad day light in a busy street, which would be more appropriately qualified as exhibicionism.

Moreover, the revealing and intimate nature of the activity cannot be ignored, considering that they were undressed and, well, having sex. I would say with some certainty that it is not something that most of us do not mind to be watched, recorded and commented, over and over, on a large-scale. And, in spite of being something that the public finds interesting, there is certainly not any public interest at stake.

Furthermore, despite acting on plain sight, the couple was absolutely unaware that their activities were being observed, let alone filmed. They did not give their consent – nor explicitly, nor implicitly – for their image to be captured. But, more relevant, they were certainly oblivious that those images and recordings would be disseminated at a large-scale. To be put within the public eye and the public attention which ensued were neither expected nor desired.

The moral damages at stake are evident. On a personal level, the couple has been publicly exposed, scorned, humiliated and shamed. Their dignity and self-esteem have been incessantly injured. At least for one of them, being married and with children, this exposure has also far more reaching consequences, affecting the family members concerned.

To say that the lesson to be learnt from this is to turn the lights off next time you intend to have sex is the easiest joke to make. However, such situations should not be socially treated so light-heartedly. Namely because with the advanced technologies available, it is getting easier to photograph and record events humiliating for someone. That is how many of the known cyber bullying situations actually start.  Technologies are evolving so fast that the general awareness and sensitivity are having a hard time keeping track of the issues at stake.

Perahps a very good first step would be for people to start accepting that it is not because they can see something, and are able to easily record it and quickly share it online, that it is legitimate to do so.It is so easy to laugh at someone’s expenses. And the next big joke could be any of us.

 

National Security: The new
responsibility of Tech
Companies?

Let's take a closer look on... everything!

Let’s take a closer look on… everything!

Private tech companies are no longer expected to only aim profit. No. Besides having been assigned with the task of distinguishing public and private interest, they are now required to act as watchdogs to the intelligence services.

I am referring today to the very interesting opinion article of Robert Hannigan, published on Financial Times, last week, which I highly recommend.

Hannigan is the new Director of CGHQ, which stands for Government Communications Headquarters, meaning the British electronic intelligence agency. It operates closely with the British security service, MI5; the overseas intelligence service, MI6; and the United States National Security Agency (NSA).

In the above-mentioned article, Hannigan called for “better arrangements for facilitating lawful investigation by security and law enforcement agencies than we have now” in order to find “a new deal between democratic governments and the technology companies in the area of protecting our citizens”.

He mainly referred to the radical group Islamic State, a.k.a. ISIS and ISIL, “whose members have grown up on the Internet” and are “exploiting the power of the web to create a jihadist threat with near-global reach.” In this context, he qualified tech companies as “the command and control networks of choice” for terrorists.

Basically, and summing it up, let’s all forget about Snowden’s revelations (which I already addressed here) and see the big picture: because terrorists are using the social media websites, tech companies such as Facebook and Twitter ought to share all our private data with law intelligence agencies to stop terrorism. As we all have a common enemy, let’s allow a more undisturbed sharing of information between the intelligence community and private technology companies of our data. In these dangerous times, who needs privacy, anyway, right?

Coincidentally or not, these declarations came in the wake of Apple and Google sophisticated encryption initiatives regarding data on their mobiles and email systems. Indeed, encryption makes the collection of data off the wires more difficult. Unsurprisingly enough, these statements are also in line with FBI Director James Foley efforts.

However, despite seemingly intended to be simultaneously inspiring, alarmist and paranoia inducing, I couldn’t help to notice that the article is actually full of contradictions which I assume were intended to go unacknowledged.

To begin with, the conclusion according to which techniques for encryption or anonymisation through mobile technology in fact help terrorists to hide from the security service – or, as stated, “are the routes for facilitation of crime and terrorism” – is quite a far-fetched one. Terrorism has been here long before new technologies as we know them and, unfortunately, terrorists have always found ways of hiding their operations quite successfully.

As for the allusion that the leaking of information by Edward Snowden has actually helped the development of terror networks… Seriously? Of course, the problem was not mass surveillance in itself. The real issue was that those monitoring activities were revealed to the world.

Besides, the use of Internet by radical groups for promotion, intimidation and online recruitment of potential fighters is already a general concern. But the thing is, as these activities happen in fact on social media platforms, everybody can actually see it. So, where does the need for a more direct and thorough access to social platforms data comes from? It is not as secret terrorist operations are expected to be conducted on Facebook or Twitter. I mean, these companies are not really known for the security of their communications.

Moreover, nobody actually believes that privacy is an absolute right. The ECHR is quite clear on that. The right to privacy shall always be balanced with other rights, freedoms and needs, as for instance the right to information, the freedom of expression and the need to ensure national security. However, I fail to see the balance between civil liberties and national security in Hannigan’s speech. Similarly, I fail to understand how the free and secretive interference in our privacy – for security reasons, always, of course – can be lawful and how its proportionality is ensured.

Likewise, why isn’t a prior court order appropriate to intelligence agencies regarding requests for data? It should be up to the courts, not the GCHQ, nor tech companies, to decide when our personal data shall be shared with the intelligence services. Courts are the only guarantee of individuals’ rights and freedoms and of principles such as necessity and proportionality of the measures taken. Tech companies cannot refuse these requests when they are based on a Court order. So, when Hannigan calls for ‘better arrangements‘ and ‘new deals’, it is very questionable what is truly meant.

Thus said, the consideration that users of social media platforms “do not want the media platforms they use with their friends and families to facilitate murder or child abuse” was just the cherry on top of a very bitter anniversary cake, the 25th anniversary of the world wide web, that Hannigan obviously hasn’t failed to mention.

These arguments are not fit for a “mature debate on privacy in the digital age”. Indeed, the fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD) is quite a well-known strategy regarding perception influence and public misinformation.

For more regarding this brilliant-for-all-the-wrong-reasons article, check the following posts.

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