The ruling better known as the ‘right to be forgotten’ decision won’t risk to be forgotten any time soon.
To make a long story short, the ECJ ruled that the operator of a search engine – in that particular case, Google – is obliged to remove from the list of search results displayed, according to a search made on the basis of a person’s name, links to web pages published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, even when its publication is otherwise lawful and the information is factually correct.
I understand (and welcome) the motivation behind the judgments. It is comforting to know that individuals, where there is no legitimate – and consequently stronger – public interest involved, may be able to move on from their past. As it is very difficult to restrict our lives to the offline world, Google and search engines in general are, nowadays, the primary instrument to find information about everything and anyone, to the point that ‘google’ is commonly used as a verb referring to an online search conducted on that search engine. Without search engines, information wouldn’t be, in the vast majority of cases, so easily accessible.
And that is certainly the main issue at stake. As stated by the Court:
(…) processing of personal data, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, carried out by the operator of a search engine is liable to affect significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual’s name, since that processing enables any internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the internet — information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty — and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him. 1)Paragraph 80th of the ruling
So a ‘right to be forgotten’ might as well be a necessary principle in an unforgetting world.
But, true to be told, the principle of giving citizens more control over their personal data – including its deletion – doesn’t come as the new right in town. It existed long before what was decided by the ECJ in several Member States’ legislation, although without such a sticky nickname. Furthermore, it is foreseen in the directive 95/46 on data protection which remains applicable to the Internet as it has developed since. And a related provision is expected to be included in the General Data Protection Regulation, intended to replace Directive 95/46/EC, currently being negotiated at the Council of the European Union. The principle of individuals being able to move on from their past therefore doesn’t come as an originality.
What was indeed a surprise, and not a good one I must admit, was the conclusion that Google, while processing information published by a third party, act and is liable as a controller, and shall delete links to articles lawfully published by third parties, which can remain available on the latter’s website.
One must admit that this conclusion is in line with the obligations that article 6(2) of the Directive foresees regarding controllers while processing personal data: the controller shall weigh its interests, those of the data controller, those of third parties and those of the data subject.
That conclusion is also in line with the observations of the Court in ASNEF and FECEMD ruling2)Joined Cases C 468/10 and C 469/10 ASNEF and FECEMD  ECR I 0000, paragraphs 44–45, regarding the relevance of the data previous appearance in public sources.
And disregarding all the questions (as mentioned here and here) that unavoidably arise while considering a search engine as a ‘controller’, the ECJ tried to establish criteria for the removal of links and consecrated a balance to be achieved to that end.
Therefore, search engines shall erase data deemed inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in the light of the time that had elapsed.3)Paragraph 94th of the ruling According to the ECJ, even accurate data, despite lawfully published initially, can “in the course of time become incompatible with the directive”.4)Paragraph 93rd of the ruling These key criteria – “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing” – shall be balanced with the economic interests of the operator of the search engine and the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name.5)Paragraph 97th of the ruling
However, as rightly pointed out by the ECJ:
(…) that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.6)Paragraph 97th of the ruling
The preponderant public interest is consequently the ultimate test to ensure that information which ought to continue widely available is not removed.
I personally doubt that the Court succeeded in defining the desirable rigorous criteria necessary to achieve a fair balance of rights to privacy and personal data against freedom of expression and information. In fact, the ECJ provides very little legal certainty as it merely portrays an unclear balancing act between the rights of the data subject against the search engine’s economic interests and the public interest, to be determined casuistically.
And this can have very serious repercussions considering that the removal of links from the list of results can have effects upon the legitimate interest of the publishers of the information and of internet users potentially interested in having access to that information.
As pointed out by the General Advocate:
The data protection problem at the heart of the present litigation only appears if an internet user types the data subject’s name and surnames into the search engine, thereby being given a link to the newspaper’s web pages with the contested announcements. In such a situation the internet user is actively using his right to receive information concerning the data subject from public sources for reasons known only to him.7)Paragraph 130 of the Opinion
And he added:
In contemporary information society, the right to search information published on the internet by means of search engines is one of the most important ways to exercise that fundamental right. This right undoubtedly covers the right to seek information relating to other individuals that is, in principle, protected by the right to private life such as information on the internet relating to an individual’s activities as a businessman or politician. An internet user’s right to information would be compromised if his search for information concerning an individual did not generate search results providing a truthful reflection of the relevant web pages but a ‘bowdlerized’ version thereof8)Paragraph 131 of the Opinion
It most certainly doesn’t help that the ECJ establishes that data subject’s rights protected by articles 7 and 8 of the Charter override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users.9)Paragraph 81st of the ruling Does this mean that the right to privacy is the general principle, only subjected to sporadic exemptions represented by the exceptional precedence of the freedom of expression and right to information?
This priority doesn’t seem to be established nor in the Charter nor in the European Convention of Human Rights. It is only expectable that a data subject’s right to protection of his private life must be balanced with other fundamental rights, namely with freedom of expression and freedom of information. Additionally, the conclusion according to which the inclusion in the list of results of a search engine constitutes a more significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to privacy than the publication on the web page, seems to forget that, nowadays, freedom of expression is not just about the right to publish, but also about being found online. We have attained a historic momentum where to not be found through a search engine or to no exist online is pretty much the same.10)Paragraph 87 of the ruling
Therefore, the applicability to search engines but not to news websites or other journalistic activities, due to exemptions for “media” under European data protection law, so the original information itself could remain, does not represent a satisfactory guarantee of the right to information at a time when people have access to both newsworthy information and publishing tools.
Considering the challenges at stake, it is very unlikely that a search engine service provider will satisfactorily balance all these conflicting interests. The general fear that the implementation of this ruling will entail sacrificing of freedom of expression and information might not come as a mere alarmism.
It is worth question whether and how this ruling will affect the negotiations for a General Data Protection Regulation currently ongoing at the Council of the European Union. The Italian Presidency circulated to the DAPIX working group a note entitled ‘Right to be forgotten and the Google judgment’ to examine how the future legislation on the right to deletion should be developed.
This raises some confusions considering that it is for the Council of the European Union and for the European Parliament, as co-legislators, to make the law as it will stand in the future and for the ECJ to interpret the law as it exists.
References [ + ]
|1.||↑||Paragraph 80th of the ruling|
|2.||↑||Joined Cases C 468/10 and C 469/10 ASNEF and FECEMD  ECR I 0000, paragraphs 44–45|
|3.||↑||Paragraph 94th of the ruling|
|4.||↑||Paragraph 93rd of the ruling|
|5.||↑||Paragraph 97th of the ruling|
|6.||↑||Paragraph 97th of the ruling|
|7.||↑||Paragraph 130 of the Opinion|
|8.||↑||Paragraph 131 of the Opinion|
|9.||↑||Paragraph 81st of the ruling|
|10.||↑||Paragraph 87 of the ruling|